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A once-thriving doctrine, today the common law right to information has been largely
forgotten by U.S. courts at both the state and federal level. But courts have not paused to
question whether the common law right still has a role to play in modern litigation. One rea-
son may be the dearth of case law explaining the common law right's operation. Another
may be that courts believe this doctrine has been eradicated by the advent of freedom of in-
formation laws. This article first brings together the disparate authority on the common law
right in an attempt to pin down the precise contours of the doctrine. It then examines the op-
eration of the various federal and state freedom of information statutes and compares them to
the common law right. Then it considers whether these statutes preempt or displace the
common law rights, ultimately concluding that the state common law right is unlikely to be
displaced, while the federal common law right is more likely displaced. Finally, this article
suggests several relatively narrow uses the common law may still serve today in the realm of
public access to information.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 330 B.C., Aeschines, one of the great Greek orators of the Classical
Age, stood upon the marble floors of an Athenian court and spoke of the
importance of the public's right to inspect its government's records, a "fine
thing, my fellow Athenians, a fine thing is the preservation of public rec-
ords. For records do not change, and they do not shift sides with traitors, but
they grant to you, the people, the opportunity to know whenever you
want."1
1,500 years later, James Madison echoed a similar sentiment, stating that
a "popular Government without popular information, or the means of ac-
quiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both .... A
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the
power which knowledge gives." 2
The public's right to information is a cornerstone of any democratic legal
systems.3 Indeed, a democratic government operating in secrecy is no de-
mocracy at all. The founding fathers realized the importance of an open
government by requiring the president to "give to the Congress information
' JAMES P. SICKINGER, PUBLIC RECORDS AND ARCHIVES IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 1 (P.J. Rhodes & Rich-
ard J. A. Talbert eds., 1999).
2 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON,
103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed. 1910).
' Jimmy Carter, Foreward to ACCESS TO INFORMATION: A KEY TO DEMOCRACY, 3 (Laura Neuman ed.,
2002).
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of the State of the Union."4 When Congress investigated the defeat of Unit-
ed States forces by the Wabash Indians in 1791, the investigating commit-
tee requested the "persons, papers and records, as may be necessary to assist
their inquiries."' George Washington was hesitant about divulging military
and agency documents, and decided to confer with then Secretary of State
Thomas Jefferson about the matter. 6 Jefferson advised Washington that the
executive branch was required to operate in the open, and that the commit-
tee, as a representative of the public, had a right to monitor the executive's
activities.7
Yet, the executive branch did not hold fast to Jefferson's sentiment. Ear-
ly United States history, up until the early 2 0 h Century, saw an executive
branch cloaked in secrecy.8 Many agencies had a reputation for releasing
few, if any, documents, resulting in a significant lack of accountability. 9
The press constantly struggled to cut back "the weed of improper secrecy
[that] had been permitted to blossom."10 Government accountability was
elusive, to say the least.11
Congress finally responded in passing the Freedom of Information Act
(the "Federal FOIA" 12)-a statute that has had a profound impact on public
oversight of executive agencies.13 The Federal FOIA generally requires ex-
ecutive agencies to release records when requested by the public unless the
documents fall under one of a number of specific exemptions. 14 State legis-
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
5 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 493 (1849).
6 See THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 179 (John P. Foley ed., 1900).
7 Id. at 179-80.
8 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2419 (detailing the
government secrecy problem that existed before FOIA statutes, explaining that the government operated
under a presumption that all of its records should not be disclosed, and constituted an official cult of
secrecy); see generally HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC
RECORDS AND PROCEEDINGS 198 (1953) (discussing the lack of a public right to inspect government
documents).
9 See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 23.
101d.
11 Id.
12 See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012) (stating the information that agencies must make available to the
public and the exceptions to this rule). The term "Federal FOIA" will be used to refer to the federal
Freedom of Information Act. The term "FOIA" by itself will be used to refer to the general concept of
either a state or federal freedom of information statute. Notably, however, states often call their FOIA
statutes by different names, such as a "Right to Know" law. See sources cited infra notes 165, 169.
See Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("The purpose of the Freedom of
Information Act... is to 'facilitate public access to Government documents'.... The Act is meant 'to
pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny"')
(quoting United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 (1991).
14 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (provisions related to certain mandatory disclosures).
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latures were quick to follow suit, and every state now has some variation of
a FOIA statute providing access to state agency records.15 Before going fur-
ther it should be mentioned: these statutes work. Both at the federal and
state level, FOIA statutes have had a profound impact. Executive agencies
have released hundreds of thousands of documents in response to FOIA re-
quests.
16
However, despite the fact that FOIA statutes have been a significant
achievement in the fight for public access to information, they have come
with their own challenges. First, agency backlogs and procedural hurdles
have substantially reduced their efficacy. For example, some Federal FOIA
requests have remained pending for 20 years without any record being pro-
duced.17 While many agencies report that they process simple requests with-
in an average of 30 days, some agencies, such as the Department of Justice,
currently have requests pending from seven years ago. 18 Time might not be
a luxury an individual can afford when she needs information for a current
news report, to construct an emergency study, or to inform ongoing litiga-
tion. 19 For these individuals a FOIA statute may be of little value.
Second, many courts have affirmed agency denials even where the re-
questor appears to have significant need and the government interest in pre-
venting disclosure appears slight.20 In fact, some commentators have opined
that courts take a relatively hands-off approach under the Federal FOIA and
allow agencies to defeat requests by raising any conceivable evidence that
one of the statutes' exemptions-such as vague confidentiality or privacy
exemptions-applies. 21 As discussed in this article, some cases brought un-
der the Federal FOIA indicate that courts may be looking harder at the gov-
'5 See generally GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY ACTS 265-435 (Robert
F. Bouchard & Justin D. Franklin eds., 1980) (providing an appendix listing state FOIA statutes).
16 See OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2011 3-4 (2011) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS].
"? See Justice Department Repeats as Rosemary Award Winner for Worst Open Government Perfor-
mance in 2012, NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/news/20130315/.
" See SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 12-14. Some agencies provide expedit-
ed options for FOIA requestors that have a compelling need for timeliness-although many agencies
avoid the practice. See OFFICE OF INFO. POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FOIA UPDATE: WHEN TO
EXPEDITE FOIA REQUESTS (Jan. 1, 1983), http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia updates/Vol IV 3/page3.h
tm.
'9 Obviously, normal discovery techniques can often be used. But to reach documents outside of the
scope of a court's subpoena power, FOIA requests are sometimes necessary.
20 See, e.g., McCutchen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(preventing disclosure of the mere names of certain scientists that were investigated by the Department
of Health and Human Services).
21 See, e.g., Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(rejecting the district court for applying too strict of a standard to agencies, and requiring only a good-
faith effort to respond to FOIA requests). See also infra pp. 31-32.
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emnment's proffered reasons for refusing FOIA requests than these critics
suggest. 22 Regardless, where the government raises exemptions, the Federal
FOIA is often not an option for individuals seeking government documents.
State FOIA statutes are even rifer with infirmities. Several states have re-
stricted the types of records that the public may request.23 Some allow agen-
cies to refuse disclosures with little evidence.t Others have narrowed the
class of individuals that may use the statute.25 In short, while both the Fed-
eral and state FOIA statutes may have solved some problems, they are far
from perfect. In fact, the United States Supreme Court recently confirmed
that states may significantly restrict the class of people that can use state
FOIAs. 26
Yet, there is at least a theoretical alternative to statutory public infor-
mation access. A common law right to information "antedates the Constitu-
tion."27 Because both state and the Federal FOIAs have shortcomings, one
might expect this common law right to be a regularly-used alternative. But
not so. Attorneys and judges have become so mired in FOIA litigation they
appear to have largely forgotten about the common law right to infor-
mation. In fact, only a handful of cases have considered the common-law
right since the rise of the FOIAs in the 1950s. 28
Some courts and commentators suggest that the common law right has
been displaced by these FOIA schemes. 29 The rationale makes sense. These
comprehensive statutes express a legislature's attempt to codify or displace
the common law right to public information. In enacting specific rules for
when citizens can request information, and in setting out specific exemp-
tions where no access should be allowed, Congress must have- as the ar-
gument goes- intended to displace the common law right.30 However,
there is little real authority affirming these contentions. Although some
courts have found common law claims to be displaced in a given case,31
22 See infra Part II. A.
23 See infra Part II. B.
24 See infra Part II. B.
25 See infra Part II. B.
26 McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1709, 1713 (2013).
27 Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993).
28 See Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (stating that the common law right is
now "[a]n infrequent subject of litigation").
29 See infra Part IV.
0 See infra Part IV.
3' See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (re-
fusing to recognize a common law right to information because of the existence of the Federal FOIA).
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courts have not yet determined that the breadth of the common law right to
information has been abrogated.3 2
What is more, the common law right to information and the FOIA
frameworks appear, in theory, to operate differently to reach potentially dif-
ferent classes of cases. This leaves open the possibility that the common
law right still could play some sort of gap-filling role in the public access
discourse. A parallel problem is that, because of the dearth of common law
right cases, and the inconsistency of the opinions, the boundaries of the
common law doctrine are hard to pin down. Thus any sort of specific com-
parison between the common law right and a FOIA is challenging.
This article seeks to answer three questions in the pursuit of firmly set-
tling the questions surrounding the common law right to information. First,
what are the precise contours of the common law right to information in the
United States? Second, was the common law right to information eradicat-
ed, as a legal matter, by the rise of state and the Federal FOIA statutes? Fi-
nally, if the common law right has survived in any meaningful way, how
can it, and should it, be used?
To answer these questions, this article proceeds in three steps. First, the
background law is explored. The operation of the common law right, the
contours of state and Federal FOIA statutes, and the overlap and differences
between the common law and the FOIAs are discussed. Second, the legal
doctrines which settle conflicts between statutory schemes and common law
rights are briefly explored, concluding that it is not clear that the entire
common law right to information has been set aside at either the state or
federal level. Finally, with an understanding of the doctrine, the statutory
schemes, and what parts of the common law right are likely to survive these
schemes-the article concludes with the suggestion that the common law
right to information can still serve an important, if narrow, role as an alter-
native public access tool.
1. The Common Law Right to Information
A. Defining the United States Common Law Right to Information
The general United States common law right to information is a remnant
of the old English common law rule that allowed citizens to inspect rec-
32 See infra Part V.
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ords.33 The English common law right was rarely granted,3 4 and was condi-
tioned on a citizen showing of "direct and tangible" interest in specific in-
formation.35 The English common law right required the information re-
quester to show "some interest different from his interest as a member of
the public." 3 6 Courts would then weigh this need or interest against the gov-
ernment's interests and decide whether to compel disclosure.37 If the re-
quester could not show the court she had a qualifying need for the infor-
mation requested no right existed.38
In the United States, both federal and state courts 39 have recognized a
common law right to information. 40 The Supreme Court squarely addressed
the common law right to information in Nixon v. Warner; the most com-
monly cited common law right to information case. 41 There, the Court ex-
amined a request by a series of broadcasters for the White House tapes that
were introduced in the Watergate litigation during the 1970s.42 Although ul-
timately denying the request, the Court offered a detailed examination of
the historical underpinnings of the common law right to information and
clearly affirmed that there was a common law right "to inspect and copy
public records and documents. '" 43
The United States common law right has developed into two doctrines
that are distinct in both authority and implementation. First, it is well ac-
cepted that the public has a First Amendment right to access certain crimi-
'" Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The Supreme Court [has] rec-
ognized that [the] English common law right of access was transferred to the American colonies."). For
a discussion of the underpinnings of the English common law right, see Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L.
332, 334-35 (NJ 1879); State v. Williams, 75 S.W. 948, 958 (1903); Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749,
750 (1928).
34 Nowack, 219 N.W. at 750.
15 Id. at 751.
36 Id.
31 See, e.g., Williams, 75 S.W. at 957 (stating that "the court does not grant ... [disclosure] until it has
taken into careful consideration all the facts and circumstances .... ) (quoting WILLIAM W. COOK, A
TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES, AND GENERAL CORPORATION LAW
675 (3rd ed. 1894)).
38 See Williams, 79 S.W. at 957. Similarly, when the Administrative Procedures Act was enacted in the
U.S. and information was requested, seeking documents from executive agencies required an interest in
or need for the information. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238
(1946).
3' As a preliminary note, because there is a dearth of case law in this area, and because the doctrines the-
oretically operate in the same manner, much of the case law for the state and federal common law will
be discussed together.
4 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
41 Id. at 598-99.
42 Id. at 591.
43 Id. at 597 (footnote omitted).
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nal and civil proceedings and related records-under both the federal and
various state constitutions. 44 This is a well-litigated area of law with courts
drawing various lines in terms of what types of cases are subject to the
right, and what types of records must be made available. 4 This constitu-
tional right does not generally interact with FOIA statutes-mainly because
FOIA statutes do not apply to judicial proceedings. 46 Thus, the constitution-
al right to information is not a focal point of this article. 47
Second, and of more import to this article, both state and federal courts
have long recognized the public's right "to inspect public records and doc-
uments."48 This right extends to every branch of government. 49 The right as
applied in the United States is similar to the English right to information. In
the United States version, as in the English version discussed above, the
government's interests-as well as private interests if the information in-
44 Richmond Newspapers was the U.S. Supreme Court's first holding that the First Amendment allows a
limited fight to certain information in criminal cases. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 563-64, 580 (1980). The Richmond Newspapers majority opinion also cited to colonial laws and
charters that required open trials, such as the 1677 New Jersey Constitution, and the 1682 and 1776
Pennsylvania constitutions. Id. at 567-68. See also Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside
Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment requires a right of access to some prelim-
inmary hearings); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) ("Although the
right of access to civil trials is not absolute, nevertheless, as a First Amendment right it is to be accorded
the due process protection that other fundamental rights enjoy.").
45 See, e.g., Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 156 F.3d 940, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1998); Grove
Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Search Warrant for
Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 572-73 (8th Cir. 1988).
46 OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE &
PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 32-36 (May 2004) (noting that the Federal FOIA only applies to certain ad-
ministrative and executive agencies).
41 The only place where the constitutional right is directly germane to this note is in the analysis of some
case law where courts seem to apply a slightly different common law right to judicial records. See infra
Part I.C. However, it should be noted that where the constitutional and common law rights are both im-
plicated, courts may prefer the common law right. The constitutional right to access may trigger com-
plex questions of constitutional law. "The common law does not afford as much substantive protection
to the interests of the press and the public as does the First Amendment." Rushford v. New Yorker Mag-
azine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). "Under the First Amendment ... the denial of access
must be necessitated by a compelling government interest and narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Id. at 253. See also Meliah Thomas, The First Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 CALIF.
L. REV. 1537, 1559-60 (2006) (discussing the higher standard of review for the constitutional right of
access). As a result, courts might cite to the canon of constitutional avoidance. See, e.g., Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[A] 'longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that
courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them."') (quoting
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 445 (1988)). This canon allows
courts to avoid the constitutional complexities of the First Amendment right in situations where the
common law right provides the basis for a decision.
48 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 331 F.3d 918, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
41 Id. at 936 ("This Court has held that the common law right of access extends beyond judicial records
to the 'public records' of all three branches of government and we are bound by our precedent.") (cita-
tion omitted).
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volves private individuals or companies-are weighed against the re-
quester's interests in seeking the information.
However, the exact contours of the United States common law right to
information are notoriously hard to define. 1 State and federal courts have
applied the doctrine only occasionally, which complicates any effort to pin
down the doctrine's requirements. 2 Two areas of confusion have emerged
over the history of the United States common law right to information; (1)
whether, like the English version, a plaintiff needs to show a special need to
have a right to information, and (2) what information may be sought and
how interests should be balanced. 3
B. The Proprietary Interest Requirement
The question of whether a proprietary interest is a threshold requirement
for the common law right is important, because-as discussed later-a re-
quirement of proprietary interest is a sharp departure from the FOIA
framework which requires no such showing. 4 If one reviews the modern
cases55 applying the common law right in various United States courts since
the nation's founding, it is unclear precisely what a plaintiff must initially
show to trigger a right to information. Some courts have apparently fol-
lowed the English rule in requiring plaintiffs to show some special need or
interest in information before the common law right exists.5 6 However, a
substantial line of cases denounces this view and holds that the policies of
5' Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978) (discussing the operation of the U.S.
common law right to information).
5' See Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 89 F.2d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
52 See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 597-99 ("An infrequent subject of litigation, [the common law right's] con-
tours have not been delineated with any precision."); Wash. Legal Found. 89 F.2d at 903.
51 Cf Anne Th6r~se B16champs, Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a
Right to Know?, NoTRE DAME L. REv. 117, 121 (1990); Note, The Common Law Right to Inspect and
Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA. L. REV. 659,666-69 (1982).
51 See infra Part II.
55 There is a dearth of recent common law right to information cases because various FOIA statutes are
typically relied on for access, and when the common law right is litigated it is usually in the context of
judicial records. Wash. Legal Found., 89 F.3d at 902 ("[T]he growth of the common law has been stunt-
ed in recent years by the spread of comprehensive disclosure statutes.... Since the Watergate cases, the
common law right of access has been invoked in federal courts with some frequency, but still almost
always in cases involving access to court documents.").
56 See, e.g., State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334 (N.J. 1879) ("The documents in question
are of a public nature, and the rule is that every person is entitled to the inspection of such instruments,
provided he shows the requisite interest therein."); Daluz v. Hawksley, 351 A.2d 820, 823 (R.I. 1976)
("[T]his court recognizes the common law right of inspection by a proper person or his agent provided
he has an interest therein which is such as would enable him to maintain or defend an action for which
the document or record sought can furnish evidence or necessary information."); see also Hanson v.
Eichstaedt, 35 N.W. 30, 31 (Wis. 1887).
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public access and open government are sufficient without any showing of
need.5
7
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Mitchell is one such
case. Mitchell indicated that many U.S. courts have approached the right as
not requiring a threshold showing of special need, because all citizens have
a right to the government's information. 8 The court stated:
In England, the right was narrowly circumscribed, and only a limited number of
persons enjoyed it. But the American courts tended to view any limitation as
"repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions," and therefore granted
all taxpayers and citizens access to public records. It was the courts' view that
"no sound reason (could be) advanced for depriving a citizen of his right; for it
is evident that the exercise thereof ... will serve as a check upon dishonest
public officials, and will in many respects conduce to the betterment of the pub-
lic service.
59
However, Brewer v. Watson, a case cited by the Supreme Court in Warn-
er Communications as authority for the Supreme Court's holding, clearly
noted the need for a citizen to show a direct, proprietary interest in inspect-
ing public records in order to use the common law right. 60
State courts appear to be conflicted as well. In Colscott v. King, an Indi-
ana Supreme Court case involving an agency's refusal to grant public ac-
cess to tax records, the court noted:
The general rule which obtained at common law was that every person was en-
titled to an inspection of public records, by himself or agent, provided he had
an interest in the matters to which such records related. Where, however, the
inspection desired was merely to gratify idle curiosity, or motives which were
purely speculative, the right of inspection, under the common law, was de-
nied.
6 1
5 See, e.g., Boylan v. Warren, 18 P. 174, 176 (Kan. 1888); Hawes v. White, 66 Me. 305, 306 (Me.
1876); Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889); State ex rel. Cole v. Rachac, 35 N.W. 7, 8
(Minn. 1887); MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d 413, 417 (Or. 1961); see also William Randolph Henrick,
Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents: "'Everybody, Practically Everything,
Anytime, Except... ", 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1105, 1108-1109 (1977) ("The nature of the interest re-
quired gradually became less personal: acting on behalf of a broader public interest (such as investigat-
ing official misconduct or a taxpayer's interest in a city's financial condition) became sufficient. Indeed,
a number of jurisdictions began to abrogate the interest requirement entirely.") (footnotes omitted).
58 United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner
Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
51 Mitchell, 551 F.2d at 1257 (footnotes omitted).
60 Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299, 303-305 (1882).
61 State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 57 N.E. 535, 537 (Ind. 1900); see also Geoffrey D. Neal, State Gov-
ernment - The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act - Public or Private Record: A Simple Distinction
Threatens the Future of Open Government in Arkansas, Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette,
Inc., 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465 (Ark. Oct. 4, 2007), 31 UALR L. REV. 351, 354 (2009) ("The com-
mon law recognized a very limited right of public access to government records in favor of those seek-
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However, Colscott ultimately rejected the proprietary interest require-
ment, citing Burton v. Tuite, a Michigan Supreme Court case that empha-
sizes the default openness of records regardless of a plaintiffs special
needs:
I do not think that any common law ever obtained in this free government that
would deny to the people thereof the right of free access to and public inspec-
tion of public records. They have an interest always in such records, and I know
of no law, written or unwritten, that provides that, before an inspection or ex-
amination of a public record is made, the citizen who wishes to make it must
show some special interest in such record. I have a right, if I see fit, to examine
the title of my neighbor's property, whether or not I have any interest in it, or
intend ever to have.
62
Similarly, a New Jersey case, Ferry v. Williams, compelled access to in-
formation even after acknowledging that "the realtor asserts no interest to
be subserved by an inspection of these letters, except that common interest
which every citizen has in the enforcement of the laws and ordinances of
the community wherein he dwells.."63 The Ferry court elaborated further on
its rejection of the alleged requirement of a special need for information,
focusing on "the more democratic character of our institutions."64
Ultimately, while some United States courts have required a special or
proprietary need for information before the right exists-the majority of
case law at both the federal and state levels indicates that no significant
showing of need must be provided.65 Most courts, focusing on traditional
American democratic ideals, reason that all citizens have a right "of free ac-
cess to and public inspection of public records.."66
ing to 'vindicate the public interest.' Access was often denied, however, because the inspector's purpose
was based improperly on curiosity or commercial gain.") (quoting JOHN J. WATKINS & RICHARD J.
PELTZ, THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 1-2 (4th ed. 2004)).
62 Burton v. Tuite, 44 N.W. 282, 285 (Mich. 1889) (emphasis added).
63 State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1879).
64 Id. at 337.
65 The author was unable to find a single case decided within the past six years that required an explicit
showing of proprietary interest to trigger the common law right to information. However, because the
doctrine has been rarely litigated in recent history older cases that have required a showing of special
interest are still arguably governing law. See, e.g., Daluz v. Hawksley, 351 A.2d 820, 823 (R.I. 1976);
see also Henrick, supra note 58, at 1108 1109 (noting that while many courts have relaxed the interest
requirement, "[n]evertheless, absent a statute, the requirement of an interest in the document itself gen-
erally remains a prerequisite to inspection").
66 See Burton, 44 N.W. at 285; Nowack v. Fuller, 219 N.W. 749, 750 (Mich. 1928) ("If there be any rule
of the English common law that denies the public the right of access to public records, it is repugnant to
the spirit of our democratic institutions. Ours is a government of the people."); Laurie Romanowich,
Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark: No Access to Taped Evidence, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 257, 261 (1982)
("[T]he common law right, like the first amendment, creates 'an informed and enlightened public opin-
ion."') (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976) rev 'd sub nom. Nixon
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But while courts generally appear to be moving away from requiring a
proprietary need to trigger the common law doctrine, this may be less true
where the records requested contain information about private citizens or
companies. In these cases, where the purpose of the request is clearly not
government accountability, courts appear more likely to require a special
interest in information as a threshold.
First, some courts have expressed concern when requests are for com-
mercial purposes, such as for competitive uses or merely to settle personal
disputes. The court in Warner Communications stated reservations about
releasing information for commercial exploitation:
Underlying each of petitioner's arguments is the crucial fact that respondents
require a court's cooperation in furthering their commercial plans. The court...
has a responsibility to exercise an informed discretion as to release of the tapes,
with a sensitive appreciation of the circumstances that led to their production.
This responsibility does not permit copying upon demand. Otherwise, there
would exist a danger that the court could become a partner in the use of the
subpoenaed material "to gratify private spite or promote public scandal."67
Second, the rationale behind the no-special-need rule is that citizens have
a right to information based on democratic ideals.68 This rationale does not
easily translate where the requestor is seeking information about a private
individual and the records just happen to be in the possession of the gov-
ernment.
In conclusion, most cases indicate that the United States common law
right does not require a special need to information to trigger the right.
However, in some jurisdictions there are older cases that have not been spe-
cifically overruled which hold that a proprietary interest is required-and
even some modern courts appear to require a special interest where private
concerns such as commercial uses are involved.
v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)).
67 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 6024603 (1978). Some other courts have been explic-
it in valuing some types of purposes over others. For example, courts have asked whether the requester
asserted "a purpose which tends to advance or further a wholesome public interest or a legitimate private
interest." S. Jersey Pub. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Expressway Auth, 591 A.2d 921, 930 (N.J. 1991)
(quoting City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 815 (1974)). See also
Neal, supra note 62, at 354 ("The common law recognized a very limited right of public access ... Ac-
cess was often denied, however, because the inspector's purpose was based improperly on curiosity or
commercial gain.") (citations omitted).
68 See sources cited supra note 66.
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C. The Common Law Right in Operation
There are two fundamental aspects of the common law right's operation:
1) determining if the type of document or information is appropriate for ac-
cess, and 2) determining whether the private requester's proffered interests
outweigh any opposing interests raised by the government. 69 Because this
latter requirement of balancing the parties' interests is highly discretionary,
this part of the doctrine has created the most confusion for courts.
To initially request a court to compel access to a document under the
common law right, the right must apply to the type of document in ques-
tion.7 0 As a threshold matter, the document or information sought must be
embodied in a government record-in other words, there must be a docu-
ment created or held by the government.7 1 Moreover, there are narrow cate-
gories of documents for which courts will never compel disclosure-such
as documents specifically covered by national security statutes.7 2
Once a plaintiff has made an initial showing that the right applies to the
document as a prima facie matter-and potentially makes a showing that
she has a special need for the information-the court undertakes a careful
balancing of competing interests.7 3 Some courts treat the government and
private requester on roughly equal terms during this balancing.7 4 The bulk
of cases appear to apply some sort of presumption of access in favor of the
requester.75 Still, because courts rarely expressly state that they are applying
69 See Wilson v. Brown, 962 A.2d 1122, 1130-32 (N.J. 2009).
7
"That does not mean that a citizen has the right to obtain free of charge in the form he desires public
records that are readily available in another form. The slip opinions of the United States Supreme Court
are provided to depository libraries throughout the land. There is no common law right to obtain them in
electronic form from the GPO." Mayo v. U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 9 F.3d 1450, 1451 (9th Cir. 1993).
7 ' For example, a common law right of access does not extend to records of a legal clinic at a public law
school, "because clinical professors at public law schools do not act as public officers or conduct official
business when they represent private clients at clinic." Sussex Commons Assocs., LLC v. Rutgers, 46
A.3d 536, 547 (N.J. 2012); see also Irval Realty, Inc. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 294 A.2d 425,
429-30 (N.J. 1972) (finding accident reports required under regulation promulgated by PUC within
common law right); New Jersey Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d. at 932 (considering memorandum of ex-
ecutive session at which executive director of Authority was fired not reached); Red Bank Register, Inc.
v. Board of Educ., 501 A.2d 985, 987 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (considering curriculum reports
developed by outside consultant for board of education).
72 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that there are a
"narrow range of documents... not subject to the right of public access at all because the records have
'traditionally been kept secret for important policy reasons"') (quoting Times Mirror Co. v. United
States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1989)).
71 Id. at 1179.
74 See id. at 1178-80.
75 See, e.g., id.; Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980) rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); See also
Henrick, supra note 48, at 1112.
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a presumption-and even more rarely explain the precise strength of the
presumption-whether future litigants can rely on a presumption is un-
clear.76
Courts have not provided significant insight on how the presumption
works, or what must be shown to overcome it. The Warner Communica-
tions decision itself indicated there is some presumption for the public's ac-
cess in the balancing 77-although the presumption's weight is unclear. The
court's holding was purposefully vague and explicitly passed on the ques-
tion of the strength or nature of the presumption. 78 A case from the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania rejected a "strong presumption" of public access,
expressing "total disagreement" with the "expansive view of the common
law right of access" promoted in some other cases 9.7  The court emphasized
that the vague language in Warner Communications was insufficient to cre-
ate a robust presumption indicating the balancing should be nearly equal.80
76 Many cases do not explicitly refer to a presumption for public access, but instead simply balance
competing interests. However, some cases espouse a powerful presumption for public access, which
significantly tips the scales. See, e.g. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th
Cir.2003) ("[W]e start with a strong presumption in favor of access to court records."); Hagestad v.
Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating in the civil context that courts should "start with a
strong presumption in favor of access" and that " [t]his presumption of access may be overcome only 'on
the basis of articulable facts known to the court, not on the basis of unsupported hypothesis or conjec-
ture"') (internal citations omitted); E.E.O.C. v. Erection Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990)
(referring to "the strong presumption in favor of copying access"); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Under common law, there is a presumption of access accorded
to judicial records.").
Notably, there are a number of judicial record cases that discuss a presumption, but these cases
may not be applicable to non-judicial records. There are two problems with relying on judicial record
cases to determine the existence or strength of a presumption. First, some authority indicates that access
to judicial records creates a more significant public interest than non-judicial records. For example, the
Third Circuit explained that the common law right "has particular applicability to judicial records."
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App.D.C.
404, 407 (1894) ("[A]ny attempt to maintain secrecy, as to the records of the court, would seem to be
inconsistent with the common understanding of what belongs to a public court of record, to which all
persons have the right of access."); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
("[T]he importance of 'public exposure to trial court proceedings' ... is well-settled.") (internal citation
omitted) rev'd sub nom. Nixonv. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
These courts, which have often found strong presumptions in the judicial record context, might
not have applied the same presumption in a non-judicial record case. Second, some courts invoke both
the common law right to information and the constitutional right creating confusion about which doc-
trine is being applied. See, e.g., Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253 (applying both the common law and constitu-
tional doctrine).
77 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 599-602 (1978).
71 Id. (noting the court "need not undertake to delineate precisely the contours of the common-law right
... [but that] on respondents' side is the presumption-however gauged in favor of public access to judi-
cial records") (emphasis added).
71 United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980) rev 'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
8
o d.
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However, other decisions emphasize that the public's right to access
government documents is a "precious common law right" and "[w]hile the
courts have sanctioned incursions on this right, they have done so only
when they have concluded that 'justice so requires."'S1 These courts begin
with a strong presumption that the public should have access to any gov-
ernment document; placing a heavy burden on the government to overcome
1) any interests or needs the individual plaintiff has, as well as 2) the policy
favoring wide public access and transparent government operations.8 2
At bottom, the dearth of case law makes delineating the precise effects of
a presumption difficult, if not impossible. Some courts have found a pre-
sumption for public access to be virtually dispositive of cases. Other courts
have apparently ignored any presumption and adopted a straightforward
balancing approach. However, courts generally provide some presumption
in favor of the requester-due to either policy reasons or the personal inter-
ests proffered by the requester.
Aside from whatever presumption a court might initially apply, the de-
fining characteristic of the common law balancing test is the broad discre-
tion trial courts wield. Trial courts wield wide discretion to determine
whether the plaintiff s, or government's, interests wins.83 There are virtually
no clear standards guiding the court's decision, and the determination is in-
herently fact-based.84 The Supreme Court in Warner Communications made
a point to explain the fact-intensive, discretionary nature of the common
law right balancing test:
It is difficult to distill from the relatively few judicial decisions a comprehen-
sive definition of what is referred to as the common-law right of access or to
identify all the factors to be weighed in determining whether access is appro-
priate .. the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the
SI United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1976) rev'd sub nom. Nixon v. Warner
Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
82 See id. at 1261; United States v. Webbe, 791 F.2d 103, 105 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[S]everal federal appel-
late decisions recognize[e] a strong presumption in favor of the common law right."); United States v.
Guzzino, 766 F.2d 302, 304 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Nat'l Broad. Co., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C.Cir. 1981)
(stating access should be denied only "if the district court, after considering the 'relevant facts and cir-
cumstances of the particular case,' and after 'weighing the interests advanced by the parties in light of
the public interest and the duty of the courts,' concludes that 'justice so requires"') (internal citations
omitted).
83See Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 599 ("[T]he decision as to access is one best left to the sound
discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances
of the particular case."); Webbe, 791 F.2d at 106, 107; United States v. Rosenthal, 763 F.2d 1291, 1295
(1 th Cir. 1985); Criden, 648 F.2d at 817 ("[A]Il parties agree that release of the tapes is a matter com-
mitted to the discretion of the trial court.... [T]he decision is uncontrolled by fixed principles or rules
of law."); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1981).
84 See Criden, 648 F.2d at 817-18 (discussing at length the nature of doctrines that are specifically left to
the discretion of the trial court).
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trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circum-
stances of the particular case. 85
What can be said is that courts will weigh any interests raised by the
government-whether it be confidentiality, encouraging individuals to con-
fide in government officers, efficiency, etc.-against the private individu-
al's interest in the information, as well as the general public's interests in
being informed.8 6 A New Jersey court noted a number of non-exhaustive
factors, revealing the discretionary nature of the balancing, stating that the
following should be considered:
(1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency functions by discourag-
ing citizens from providing information to the government; (2) the effect dis-
closure may have upon persons who have given such information, and whether
they did so in reliance that their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent
to which agency self-evaluation, program improvement, or other decisionmak-
ing will be chilled by disclosure; (4) the degree to which the information sought
includes factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of policymakers; (5)
whether any findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected
by remedial measures instituted by the investigative agency; and (6) whether
any agency disciplinary or investigatory proceedings have arisen that may cir-
cumscribe the individual's asserted need for the materials . .. [T]he court
should balance against these and any other relevant factors ... the importance
of the information sought to the plaintiff's vindication of the public interest."'
It is difficult to articulate any bright line rule for when a court will decide
to allow or prevent disclosure when applying its wide discretion to balance
interests under the common law test. Courts have prohibited access where
judges suspected that information was to be used "to gratify private spite or
promote public scandal" through the publication of "the painful, and some-
times disgusting, details of a divorce case."88 The Warner Communications
case itself ended up affirming the President's decision to withhold the Wa-
tergate tapes, but it remained unclear precisely which of the President's ar-
guments was relied on-one of which was that the President had a property
right in his voice.89
One principle that is clear from a review of the relevant case law, and the
very nature of the courts' balancing process, is that courts maintain control
over the substantive decision to compel access to information. The court
85 Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 598-99.
86 See S. Jersey Publ'g. Co., Inc. v. New Jersey Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d 921, 926 (N.J. 1991) (New
Jersey Supreme Court went through the balancing process at some length).
87 Id.
88 In re Caswell, 29 A. 259, 259 (R.I. 1893); see also King v. King, 168 P. 730, 731 (Wyo. 1917).
89 Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. at 589, 600 (considering claims of unfair appropriation of the Pres-
ident's voice).
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wades through the facts, and considers the significance of both sides' inter-
ests. A presumption, if one applies, makes it more likely that the plaintiff
will win even where the government cites some interest in nondisclosure.
Another ramification of the court's wide discretion is a lack of signifi-
cant appellate review. Warner Communications noted in this vein that the
"few cases that have recognized [the common law] right do agree that the
decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial
court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circum-
stances of the particular case."90
Thus the trial courts' application of the common law balancing test is
generally reviewed only for abuse of discretion-leaving the trial court with
the ability to tailor disclosures to the parties' specific needs and interests.9 1
II. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION STATUTES
A. The Operation of the Federal FOIA
The Federal FOIA allows any person9 2 to request any record from any
federal agency or government-controlled entity on any subject without say-
ing why the record was requested.93 "Record" has been interpreted expan-
sively to include information stored on any form of media.9 4 The Federal
FOIA does not apply to records held by state or local governments, the
courts, private individuals or private companies.95 The Federal FOIA does
9 I1d. at 599.
9' See San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 187 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Where
the district court conscientiously undertakes this balancing test, basing its decision on compelling rea-
sons and specific factual findings, its determination will be reviewed only for abuse of discretion.").
92 This term is broad, referring to people, corporations, or other entities. 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2012); see
also U.S. Dep't of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994) (treating a union as a
person' requesting information under FOIA).
" 5 U.S.C §552(3) (2012).
9' See David C. Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-
to-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1797 (2008) ("The right of access conferred by FOIA could not
have been more broadly conceived. It allows 'any person' . . . to request any record from any federal
agency or government-controlled entity on any subject .... [T]he breadth of FOIA' s coverage is driven
home by the fact that the word 'record' is read expansively to include not just paper records but also
information stored on virtually any form of media."); Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541
U.S. 157, 165 (2004) (photographs are records); McCutchen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
30 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1994)(explaining that an agency denying a FOIA request has the burden of
justifying withholding the information); Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, I F.3d 1274, 1283
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (computer-backups are records); Save the Dolphins v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 404 F.
Supp. 407, 411 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (motion picture is a record).
95 U.S. H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON USING THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 TO REQUEST GOVERNMENT RECORDS, H.R. REP.
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not apply to the President, or to the President's advisors.9 6 Moreover, it does
not apply to the legislature.9 7
Agencies need only conduct a "reasonable" search for requested docu-
ments.98 What is "reasonable" is determined under the circumstances, and
generally allows the agency to refuse disclosure because of excessive time
or expense.99 If the documents do not show up in a reasonable search, the
agency's duties are met and the requester is left record-less. 100
Under the Federal FOIA requesters may be able to recover statutory at-
torney's fees. 1 1 This allows entities that cannot afford extensive litigation
over a common law right to hire attorneys willing to represent them for the
statutory payment. Congress realized in the 1970's that, because there was
no intrinsic value to public document requests, only "well-heeled" individ-
uals were able to utilize the Federal FOIA. 10 2 Congress thus crafted a
scheme for awarding attorney's fees to certain plaintiffs successful in bring-
ing a Federal FOIA claim. 103 Under the scheme, any plaintiff that has "sub-
stantially prevailed" in a FOIA suit may receive "reasonable attorney's fees
and other litigation costs reasonably incurred. '"1 0 4 To "substantially prevail"
a requestor must show that the Federal FOIA suit was both reasonably nec-
essary and played a role in causing the disclosure of information. 105
No. 103-104, pt. 6, at 5 (1993).
96 Nat'l Sec. Archive v. Archivist of the U.S., 909 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
17 See 5 U.S.C. §551(1)(A) (2012).
98 See 5 U.S.C. §552(3)(C); see also Miller v. U.S. Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
99 Campbell v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 28 (D.C. Cir 1998) ("FOIA demands only a reasona-
ble search tailored to the nature of a particular request.").
'. See id. (holding that the state department was not required to comply with FOIA request, because
FOIA only requires the department to use reasonable efforts to find documents-and it would take un-
reasonable effort to reconstruct and find the requested documents); see also, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd.
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 16142 (1975) (discussing reasonable search requirement);
Landmark Legal Found. v. E.P.A., 272 F.Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing whether the EPA
conducted a reasonable search in response to a FOIA request); Allnutt v. Dep't of Justice, 2000 WL
852455 at *12 (D. Md. Oct.23, 2000) (holding that an agency need not conduct extensive research in
response to a FOIA request); Hudgins v. IRS, 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that an agency
is not required to "answer questions disguised as a FOIA request").
... 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).
112 See 1 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES
99 (1974).
13 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
'5 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i).
1s See Crooker v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 776 F.2d 366, 367 (1st Cir. 1985); Guam Contractors Ass'n v.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, 570 F.Supp. 163, 166 26 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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Unlike the common law right which applied a vague balancing test, the
Federal FOIA provides for nine specific exemptions to public access. 10 6 If
none of the nine exemptions are triggered, the agency must disclose the re-
quested record.10 7 Unlike the common law test, which balances the parties'
interests in every case, the parties' interests are weighed under the Federal
FOIA only where one of a select few exemptions are triggered.108 The nine
exemptions state that agencies need not divulge records for one of a variety
of public policy reasons.109 Two of the most utilized-and contentious-
involve privacy1  and confidentiality.1  Other examples of exempted cate-
gories of documents include: certain internal operating documents, docu-
ments containing trade secrets or confidential financial information, docu-
ments containing private medical information, and some types of records
compiled by law enforcement personnel.1 2 In short, these exemptions rep-
resent Congress's codification of the various interests the government has
long used to deny information requests under the common law right to in-
formation.113
The Federal FOIA statute is designed to operate without judicial interfer-
ence. However, if an agency refuses to comply with a FOIA request by al-
leging that one of the exemptions are triggered, the requester may seek ju-
dicial review of the agency's decision.1 1 4 It is settled that the burden is on
the government to establish that one of FOIA's statutory exemptions ap-
1.6 The exemptions include: national security, internal agency personnel rules and practices, information
already specifically exempted from disclosure by other federal law, trade secrets and confidential com-
mercial information, internal agency memoranda and policy discussions, personal privacy, law enforce-
ment investigations, federally regulated banks, oil and gas wells. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1-9). Notably, only
the exemption for information specifically exempted under other laws is mandatory. See § 552(b)(3).
§ 552(b).
0 To determine whether some of the exemptions apply the court does balance interests. However, the
balancing is between the public policy behind the disclosure and the government's proffered interests-
for example, in confidentiality. The balancing does not consider the plaintiff's proffered reasons for
needing or wanting the information under the federal FOIA. See infra Part III.
'0 See § 552(b).
I0 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 2; § 552(b)(6).
SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 2; § 552(b)(4).
112 See § 552(b).
1" See, e.g., Farley v. Worley, 599 S.E.2d 835, 844 n.l0 (W.Va. 2004) ("The federal FOIA codifies this
judicially crafted rule.").
"4 See § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). In addition, courts have interpreted the federal FOIA as requiring exhaustion of
an agency's internal remedies for disclosure denials before seeking judicial review. See Oglesby v. U.S.
Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61-62 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (referring to the Administrative Procedure Act's
exhaustion requirement).
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ply.115 Moreover courts, in theory, are directed to apply a de novo review of
the agency's refusal.1 16
The statute and regulations lay out various procedural requirements, in-
cluding that responses to FOIA requests be made promptly. 117 But agency
delay remains one of the major hurdles to FOIA's efficacy.118 The Justice
Department alone received 63,103 FOIA requests in fiscal year 2011.119
However, the agency only processed 63,992 requests during the same
year. 120 Backlogged requests across government agencies rose from 69,526
in 2010 to 83,490 in 2011.121 In 2011, the Department of Labor averaged a
delay of 214.9 days in answering requests. 122 Another agency, the Council
for Environment Quality, averaged 484.8 days. 123
In 2011, the Justice Department granted only 69.5% of the Federal FOIA
requests submitted.124 The most common exemptions cited for denials were
exemption 6 (personal and medical files), 7c (invasion of personal privacy),
and exemption 7e (law enforcement investigation information). 125
The other major challenge to FOIA's efficacy has been the interpreta-
tions of the FOIA exemptions by many agencies. 126 For example, agencies
have refused FOIA claims because individuals did not "reasonably de-
scribe" the request or were otherwise "improper" in their requests. 127 Final-
ly, courts have often delayed reviewing Federal FOIA decisions.
128
115 See, e.g., Miller v. U.S. Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1985).
116 § 552; McCutchen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("Under FOIA, the burden is on the agency to justify withholding requested information and the agen-
cy's refusal to disclose it is subject to de novo review by the district court.").
"7 See generally § 552 (providing procedural requirements for compliance).
118 See Shannon E. Martin & Gerry Lanosga, The Historical and Legal Underpinnings ofAccess to Pub-
lic Documents, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 613, 627 (2010) ("[T]he timeliness of responses to [FOIA] requests,
even in the age of digital communication, has continued to be a problem in some federal agencies").
".9 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 2.
120 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 3.
121 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 10.
122 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 13.
123 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 14.
124 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 4.
125 SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 7.
126 See Melissa Guy & Melanie Oberlin, Assessing the Health of FOIA After 2000 Through the Lens of
the National Security Archive and Federal Government Audits, 101 LAw LIBR. J. 331, 332 (2009)
("[T]he increased use of alternative designations (such as SBU) to restrict government information pre-
sent a significant threat to the effectiveness of FOIA.").
'27 See SUMMARY OF ANNUAL FOIA REPORTS, supra note 16, at 5.
128 See Martin & Lanosga, supra note 119 ("FOIA court cases have also worked very slowly through the
system. Some cases have lasted over a decade and received much notoriety.").
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Some past problems regarding FOIA efficacy stem from presidential in-
tervention. In 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a directive to
executive agencies allowing them to deny FOIA requests if there was any
plausible basis. 129 Ashcroft's memo stated that the Department of Justice
would defend any agency refusals if there were any plausible basis for the
agency's refusal to disclose. 130 Agencies were warned to assess disclosure
decisions carefully and that decisions to disclose records "should be made
only after full and deliberate consideration of the institutional, commercial,
and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by disclosure." '13 1
The Ashcroft memorandum replaced a memorandum issued by Ashcroft's
predecessor, Attorney General Janet Reno, which instructed the Justice De-
partment not to defend agency withholdings under FOIA unless there was a
real governmental interest for refusing disclosure. 13 2 The impact of Ashcroft
memorandum's was severe. Agencies found it much easier to refuse disclo-
sure of information that prior administrations would have released. 133
President Obama has promised to increase FOIA's effectiveness by en-
couraging agencies to apply an affirmative presumption of "openness" to all
information requests. 13 4 In this vein Attorney General Eric Holder instituted
guidance documents delineating new guidelines that encourage openness
and compliance with FOIA requests even where a request could "technical-
ly" be denied.135 In a memorandum from 2009, President Obama leaves lit-
tle doubt that executive agencies should comply with FOIA requests except
where the government's interest is exceptionally significant:
The Freedom of Information Act should be administered with a
clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails. The Government
should not keep information confidential merely because public officials might
be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, or
because of speculative or abstract fears. Nondisclosure should never be based
on an effort to protect the personal interests of Government officials at the ex-
129 Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft on the Freedom of Information Act for Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB
84/Ashcroft%20Memorandum.pdf.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Janet Reno on the Freedom of Information Act for Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts and Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/blog/foia-update-attorney-
general-renos-foia-memorandum.
"33 See Guy & Oberlin, supra note 127, at 340 (describing agency responses to FOIA and the difficulties
involved in getting agencies to disclose requested information).
131 Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2009 DCPD No. 00009
(Jan, 21, 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-200900009/pdf/DCPD-200900009.p
df.
'35 Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Eric Holder on the Freedom of Information Act to Heads of Exec.
Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/foia-memo-march2009.pdf
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pense of those they are supposed to serve. In responding to requests under the
FOIA, executive branch agencies (agencies) should act promptly and in a spirit
of cooperation, recognizing that such agencies are servants of the public.136
Agencies have been slow to incorporate and comply with the President's
and Attorney General's directives. Most agencies have not even updated
their FOIA policies since these changes were instituted. 13 7
The courts themselves vacillate in how strictly the exemptions are ap-
plied when reviewing agency refusals. It is outside the purview of this arti-
cle to make any empirical claims in terms of how restrictive or favorable
courts are in applying the Federal FOIA exemptions. The only point made
here is that courts appear to balance the public against the government in-
terest to different degrees-and that commentators disagree about how
courts apply the exemptions.
Some say that many courts have largely become willing to uphold agen-
cy denials of FOIA requests138 upon even the slightest government showing
that confidentiality or some other interest specified by the FOIA exemp-
tions is at play.139 One commentator sums up this tendency some courts
have to defer to agency refusals by broadening the ambit of exemptions:
Courts have interpreted exemptions in FOIA and other statutes for trade secrets
and confidential business information quite expansively, creating a broad and
widening gap in the public's ability to acquire environmental information gen-
erated by corporations and submitted to the government to enable it to carry out
its environmental-protection responsibilities.140
Another commentator sums up judicial preference for agencies as fol-
lows:
136 See Memorandum on the Freedom of Information Act, DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2009 DCPD No.
00009.
137 Justice Department Repeats as Rosemary Award Winner for Worst Open Government Performance
in 2012, supra note 17. The National Security Archive's audit of federal agencies shows that 53 out of
100 agencies have not updated their regulations since Congress amended the Federal FOIA in 2007. The
Archive report also indicates that only one of the three agencies that updated have even complied with
the requirements of the statute. Id.
138 In fact, some courts have simply deferred to agencies' procedural decisions to a large extent, for ex-
ample, finding lengthy delays permissible as long as the court believes the agency is acting in "good
faith" and with "due diligence." See generally Open Am. v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting the district court for applying too strict of a standard to agen-
cies, and requiring only a good-faith effort to respond to FOIA requests).
' See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of Information Act 1966-2006: A
Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public Interest in Knowing What the Govern-
ment's Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 511, 514 (2006).
140 David Vladeck, Information Access-Surveying the Current Legal Landscape of Federal Right-to-
Know Laws, REDORBIT (Aug. 22, 2008), www.redorbit.com/news/business/1529719/information access
srveying the current legal landscape of federal righttoknow laws/.
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[The Supreme] Court has tipped the scales significantly in favor of a broadly
construed and vaguely framed right to privacy over the public's right of access
to government-held information .... The Court maintains that even a minimal
privacy interest is sufficient to raise Exemption 6 as a bar to disclosure. Fur-
ther, the FOIA's "central purpose" is to provide access to only those records
that directly shed light on official agency activities and performance. Finally,
when an FOIA requester seeks law enforcement records to investigate govern-
ment wrongdoing, then the requester must establish a sufficient reason for ob-
taining the documents by producing evidence that the alleged government im-
propriety might have occurred. 
14 1
If these commentators are correct FOIA's efficacy has largely been
blunted in certain types of information requests. For example, in the case of
requests for records containing personally identifiable information the gov-
ernment can easily deny the request by showing even a slight interest in
maintaining confidentiality. 142 A requestor may have an important need for
information, and be unlucky enough to find herself before a court that be-
lieves even minimal government interests trigger an exemption automatical-
ly.
14 3
At least some courts affirm agency denials based on a relatively weak
government interest as long as an exemption appears triggered. For exam-
ple, some courts have held that information need only be minimally private
to trigger an exemption. 144 These courts have held that records need not con-
tain highly intimate or personal details to be exempted, often easily refuting
FOIA requests where private individual information is present in the re-
quested record.145 Even information in a passport has been held to trigger
the privacy exemption. 146
14' Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 140, at 514.
142 See generally Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding that reports submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be automatically
ruled confidential and outside of reach of the federal FOIA if the reports were voluntarily given and not
ordinarily disclosed to the public).
'43 E.g., compare McCutchen v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Sevs., 30 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(holding that a group of scientists' privacy interest in not having their names released in relation to a
misconduct hearing was sufficient to trigger the privacy exemption under FOIA), with GC Micro Corp.
v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding exemption not met where records
sought had some information regarding private company sub-contractors).
'" The foundational case for the proposition that the privacy standard is minimal is U. S. Dep't of State
v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982) which held that the privacy exemption triggered even
where the documents did not contain intimate or highly personal information. The Court stated that "we
do not think that Congress meant to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only a dis-
crete kind of personal information ... [t]he exemption [was] intended to cover detailed Government
records on an individual which canbe identified as applying to that individual." 456 U.S. at 602.
'45 Halstuck & Chamberlin, supra note 140, at 542 (discussing the "minimal privacy" standard).
146 Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. at 6004601.
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Moreover, courts have held that requests under the Federal FOIA should
be permitted only where disclosure serves the Act's "central purpose" of
shedding light on agency activities-thus where this purpose is not met,
disclosure is much less likely to be required. 147 Consequently, if the gov-
ernment can argue an individual is seeking public records for uses unrelated
to "shedding light" on agency actions, he or she may operate at a significant
disadvantage during the courts' application of the common law balancing
test. 148
The Supreme Court has stated that "the usual rule that the citizen need
not offer a reason for requesting the information must be inapplicable" in
some situations where certain exemptions are raised. 149 For example, the
Court in Nat 'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish that:
Where the privacy concerns addressed by Exemption 7(C) are present, the ex-
emption requires the person requesting the information to establish a sufficient
reason for the disclosure. First, the citizen must show that the public interest
sought to be advanced is a significant one, an interest more specific than having
the information for its own sake. Second, the citizen must show the information
is likely to advance that interest. Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is unwar-
ranted.1 50
However, other courts have been willing to conduct a more careful and
scrutinizing analysis, and have found the exemptions met only where the
government is able to show a high degree of confidentiality, privacy, or
other qualifying interest.151
Courts are more likely to apply the FOIA exemptions categorically as
opposed to the factual balancing found in common law right to information
cases. 152 For example, courts sometimes find a Federal FOIA exemption is
47 U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772 (1989).
141 See id. at 773, 775 ("There is, unquestionably, some public interest in providing interested citizens
with answers to their questions about Medico. But that interest falls outside the ambit of the public inter-
est that the FOIA was enacted to serve."); see also Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541
U.S. 157, 171-72 (2004) ("FOIA is often explained as a means for citizens to know 'what their Gov-
ermnent is up to.' This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.") (internal citations
omitted).
14' Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.
150 Id.
'5' See, e.g., Painting & Drywall Work Pres. Fund, Inc. v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 936 F.2d 1300,
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("A court must identify the privacy interest sered by withholding information
and then the public interest that would be advanced by disclosing it. Having done so, the court must de-
termine 'whether, on balance, disclosure would work a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal priva-
cy. ') (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
152 Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("The circumstances of this case lend themselves to categorical treatment. It is a matter of common
sense that the disclosure of information the Government has secured from voluntary sources on a confi-
dential basis will both jeopardize its continuing ability to secure such data on a cooperative basis and
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met in situations involving voluntary disclosures of information-without
any balancing.153 The text of the statute itself simply exempts certain infor-
mation as opposed to calling for a case-by-base balancing of interests. 154
Furthermore, even when a balancing does occur, courts generally weigh
the public interest against the specific government interest at issue-the in-
dividual's interest has no place in the analysis.155 Under the Federal FOIA,
if an exemption is not met for one person, it is not met for anyone. 156 In oth-
er words, the statute works much more like an "on-off' switch than a dis-
cretionary judicial process.
Several conclusions can be drawn about the operation of the Federal
FOIA. First, there are procedural challenges to using the statute in light of
agency backlogs and procedural hurdles. Second, courts appear to apply ex-
emptions categorically, usually finding the exemption triggered, or not,
without undergoing careful balancing of the requester's interest. Third,
where courts do conduct balancing for certain exemptions such as privacy
or confidentiality, they are not always consistent and may favor the gov-
ernment's refusal to disclose. Fourth, courts never consider the requestor's
private interests when determining whether an exemption is triggered.
These last two points highlight a fundamental difference from the common
law right to information. While the common law right vested the decision of
whether to compel disclosure to courts, many of the policy decisions about
whether disclosure should happen under the Federal FOIA have been made
by Congress.
B. The Operation of State FOIAs
Shortly following the passage of the Federal FOIA, every state enacted a
similar open records statute giving various entities broad access to state and
local agency records. 157 Many state FOIA statutes are similar to the federal
injure the provider's interest in preventing its unauthorized release.").
153 Id.
154 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2012).
155 Painting & Drywall Work Pres. Fund, Inc., 936 F.2d at 1302 ("Because FOIA requires disclosure to
,any person,' the balancing of the privacy against the public interest cannot depend on the identity and
specific purpose of the party requesting the information. If it must be released to one requester, it must
be released to all, regardless of the uses to which it might be put.") (citations omitted).
156 Id.
151 See Herald Pub. Co., Inc. v. Barnwell, 351 S.E. 2d 878, 881 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he legislature
of every state as well as the Congress of the United States has enacted open meeting laws, or freedom of
information acts, in some form or another.").
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version.158 In fact, the similarities are so compelling that state courts have
often looked to federal case law as persuasive authority in state FOIA dis-
putes.159 California, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and the District of Co-
lumbia all modeled their information statutes in part or whole on the Feder-
al FOIA. 160
Most state statutes, like the Federal FOIA, have either been construed in
favor of wide disclosure, or specifically state some sort of presumption of
disclosure. 161 Thus, in most states, there may be little difference operational-
ly between state and Federal FOIAs-even if there are some minor differ-
ences.
Yet, some of the state statutes do not parallel the Federal FOIA. For ex-
ample, Nevada's FOIA statute states "that all public books and public rec-
ords of a governmental entity, the contents of which are not otherwise de-
clared by law to be confidential, must be open at all times during office
hours to inspection by any person."162 If a legal authority has not specifical-
ly declared a document to be confidential, the statute requires the agency to
"use [a] balancing test, applied in consultation with its legal counsel."1 63
Some states have limited the individuals who can utilize the state FOIA
framework, allowing access of information to "citizens" of their states.1 64
This would leave the common law right as the only option for people who
do not meet the statute's user requirements.
In fact, in 2013 the United States Supreme Court held that a state's re-
striction of its FOIA statute to its own residents does not run afoul of the
constitution-perhaps paving the way for other states to aggressively police
158 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Woodstock Acad. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n., 436 A.2d 266, 270 (Conn.
1980); Bredemeier v. Kentwood Bd. of Educ., 291 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (noting the
similarity of the Federal Freedom of Information Act statute and the state Freedom of Information Act
statutes in Connecticut and Michigan, respectively).
' See, e.g., Laramie River Conservation Council v. Dinger, 567 P.2d 731, 733 (Wyo. 1977) (holding
that Wyoming provision is similar to the federal Freedom of Information Act provision and thus inter-
preted in a similar manner); Sattler v. Holliday, 318 S.E.2d 50, 51-52 (W. Va. 1984).
160 1 CRIM. PRACTICE MANUAL, STATE INFO. PRACTICE § 21:58 (6th ed. 2004).
161 In reviewing the cases from Roger A. Nowadzky, A Comparative Analysis of Public Records Stat-
utes, 28 URB. LAW. 65, n. 6 (1996) (citing cases and statutes from all fifty states), it is clear there is a
strong presumption of disclosure generally.
162 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 239.010 (West 2011).
163 Id.
164 ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (2013); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253
(West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29. § 10003 (West 2013); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 109.180 (West 2013);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102 (West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-712.01 (West 2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4 (2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-5 (West 2013); 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 67.701
(West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3704 (2012).
COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INFORMATION
this restriction. 165 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alito left no doubt
that states may restrict their FOIA statues so that only their own residents
may utilize them.166 The Court dismissed petitioners' "sweeping" argument
that a right to public records is a "fundamental" right.167 The Court, in short,
confirmed that for out-of-state residents, FOIA is simply not an option if
they want to seek state public records.
Other states have narrowed the statute to only be available to "persons"
thus excluding corporations or other entities.1 68 This would require a corpo-
ration to use the common law right because the FOIA statute is not an op-
tion.
Most state FOIA statutes operate like the Federal FOIA in that an infor-
mation requester need not show any need or interest in information to make
a request. 169 However, some states require some sort of interest, or conduct
a mandatory balancing of interests, before requiring disclosure.1 70 Where
privacy, confidentiality, or a wide range of other interests such as the best
interest of the state militates against disclosure, some states enter different
balancing schemes to determine whether information should be disclosed. 171
Remarkably, one state explicitly allows interested individuals to seek an in-
junction to prevent disclosure under the state FOIA for a compelling rea-
son.
172
State FOIAs have numerous exemptions and nuances not contemplated
by the Federal FOIA. For example, in Pennsylvania, until the law was re-
cently repealed, a disclosure that would result in the loss of federal funds
was exempted from the statutory right to information.1 7 3 In Nevada, divorce
165 McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709 (2013). The statute at issue was Virginia's FOIA. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 2.2-3700 (2012).
166 McBurney, 133 S.Ct. at 1720.
167 McBurney, 133 S.Ct. at 1712.
168 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 1-19 (West 2013); D.C. CODE § 2-532 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.07 (West 2013); IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-3 (West 2013); IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2 (West 2013).
169 See, e.g., Mans v. Lebanon Sch. Bd., 290 A.2d 866, 867 (N.H. 1972) (stating that a requester's rights
"do not depend upon his demonstrating a need for the informationt"); N. Jersey Newspapers Co. v. Pas-
saic Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 601 A.2d 693, 695 (N.J. 1992).
17' See, e.g., Child Prot. Grp. v. Cline, 350 S.E.2d 541, 543 (W.Va. 1986) (applying the balancing man-
dated under Virginia law).
'"' See Stone v. Consol. Publ'g Co., 404 So. 2d 678, 681 (Ala. 1981) ("Courts must balance the interest
of the citizens in knowing what their public officers are doing in the discharge of public duties against
the interest of the general public in having the business of government carried on efficiently and without
undue interference.") (citing MacEwan v. Holm, 359 P.2d 413 (Or. 1961)); Nowadzky, supra note 162,
at 79-80 (discussing various state balancing schemes and presumptions)
172 IOWA CODE ANN. § 22.2.
17' 65 PA. STAT. ANN. § 66.1(2) (West 2014) (repealed).
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action information is exempted. 174 At the same time, Nevada's FOIA gener-
ally gives wide access to all records created by state or county offices. 175
Some states have no restrictions on personnel records-others do not allow
inspection.1 76 Some states have attempted to create robust privacy statutes
that foreclose the use of the state FOIA for large classes of documents.1 77
Some state statutes operate in unique ways. For example, Maryland's
open records law divides confidential information into two categories: 1)
required denials and 2) permissible denials.1 78 Denials are required when the
public record is privileged or confidential, or when inspection would be
contrary to a state statute, a federal statute or regulation, rules of the court,
or a court order.1 79 Agencies then have discretion to refuse disclosure in a
wide variety of circumstances where some privacy, confidentiality, or other
government interests are implicated by the disclosure. New Jersey's right-
to-know law does not contain "specific substantive standards that define
exclusions from its coverage."1 0 Instead, it leaves the task of delineating
which records are confidential to the executive or judiciary. 81
The state FOIAs largely operate like the federal version in that most
states have a powerful presumption for disclosure. State statutes often in-
clude specific exemptions that are either triggered-or not-without bal-
ancing the requestor's private interests. However, some state FOIAs do op-
erate differently, either restricting who can use the statute, exempting large
classes of documents from the statute's reach, or creating unique balancing
tests or other schemes.
III. COMPARING FOIAs AND THE COMMON LAW RIGHT
Several differences arise when comparing the common law right to in-
formation and FOIAs. First, FOIA statutes and the common law right are
different procedurally. Under FOIA statutes, individuals request specific
documents. The agency then must undertake a "reasonable" search for the
documents either specifically identified or containing information request-
ed-if a reasonable search does not reveal the documents requested, the
174 NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (2011) (repealed 2008).
175 Id.
176 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 2014).
177 See, e.g., id.
178 MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 10-615 to 10-618 (LexisNexis 2009).
179 Id.
1" McClain v. Coll. Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 996 (N.J. 1985).
181 Id.
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agency has complied with its duties and the requester leaves with nothing.
The common law right allows requestors to petition the court to compel an
agency to disclose information. This right is an open-ended ability to "in-
spect" records. While in some cases it may operate similarly to a FOIA re-
quest-a court orders disclosure of specific documents-the common law
right grants requesters a wide right to gain access to records even where the
documents' precise nature are unknown. 18 2 This distinction potentially re-
moves one common agency tactic for FOIA refusals: "we did not find the
document after a reasonable search." More importantly, the common law
right allows persons to seek relatively timely disclosure by petitioning the
court directly without having to exhaust an agency backlog of requests. Un-
der the common FOIA scheme, to petition the court in the event that an
agency refuses to disclose a document a requester must first wait in the
agency backlog, and then she must proceed through the normal litigation
process only after the agency's request process is exhausted.183
This procedural difference creates the possibility for a difference in the
timeframe for request responses. While agencies are notorious for wading
through backlogs for years before responding to a request, the common law
right to access would potentially require access to records within a more
prompt timeframe. The common law right has no statutory boundaries or
processes for the agency to rely on, and the requester may inspect the doc-
uments him or herself.184 A robust common law right today might operate
similarly to FOIA frameworks, with backlogs and agencies, not requestors,
as the primary document collector. But the potential exists for different pro-
cedural options, more flexibility in what information is accessible, 85 and
courts with more discretion to weigh party interests.
Second, the common law right and FOIA statutes could have different
threshold requirements before information may be requested. As discussed
above, courts vacillate on whether a showing of special interest is required
182 See Board of Educ. of Newark v. New Jersey Dep't of Treasury, 678 A.2d 660, 665-66 (N.J. 1996);
Education Law Center v. New Jersey Dep't of Educ., 966 A.2d 1054, 1071 (N.J. 2009) (citing Higg-A-
Rella Inc. v. Cnty. of Essex, 660 A.2d 1163, 1168 (N.J.1995)).
183 See Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (requiring agency exhaustion
before allowing judicial review of FOIA denial). Another difference between the common law right and
the FOIA schemes is that at least the Federal FOIA allows a plaintiff to collect attorney's fees. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(E)(i). There is no analogous fee-shifting scheme under the common law right.
184 Admittedly, this is a very general analysis only meant to highlight the issue. See Daluz v. Hawksley,
351 A.2d 820, 823 (R.I. 1976) (holding that a person or their agent has a common law right to inspection
only when the person has demonstrated a specific interest).
185 Requestors would potentially have more flexibility in a common law scheme because there are no
bright-line exemptions. Requestors could argue that even documents long denied under precedent should
be disclosed in extreme cases where important interests are asserted-while FOIA schemes do not even
allow courts to consider this option. See Education Law Center, 966 A.2d at 1071-1072.
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before disclosures are granted under the common law right. 18 6 The threshold
requirement would create a substantive difference for plaintiffs in those
states and courts that would require a special need to trigger a common law
right. Courts may balance the parties' interests more favorably for the indi-
vidual requester within a framework where plaintiffs have already shown a
proprietary need for information to get into court. This is in sharp contrast
to a FOIA requester who, according to the statute, need show no special
need for information to submit a request.
Third, the substantive standard for whether an individual's right to a
document supersedes the government's interests differs between the doc-
trines. The common law right balances the individual's interests versus the
government's- applying a presumption for the plaintiff ranging from the
relatively slight to severe depending on the court. 18 7 This is an intensely fac-
tual balancing in which the court considers each side's interest and the facts
of the situations. Courts can consider factors that appear relevant under the
circumstances. They make the policy decisions and determine whose inter-
ests are more compelling.
In contrast, the FOIA framework automatically requires disclosure unless
the government can establish a specific exemption applies. If an exemption
applies, disclosure may be withheld, period. While the balancing is some-
times factual in a FOIA case, there are defined substantive standards for
when the government may-and may not-deny disclosure. In other words,
while courts are the primary determiners of document disclosure under the
common law, the legislature is the primary determiner in FOIA schemes.
The court is merely present to determine whether the government has satis-
fied the language of a statutory exemption as a legal matter, not to consider
the merits of the plaintiffs claims to the information in an abstract sense.
FOIA creates a categorical approach to information disclosure-the infor-
mation is either in or out. The same type of record will consistently be ei-
ther accessible or inaccessible regardless of the requestor's interests. Cases,
in theory, should not vary if the same type of record is at issue, unlike the
common law approach, which is specifically permitted to vary from case to
case based on the interests raised. Another difference arises where FOIA
calls for some balancing-such as where the confidentiality or privacy ex-
emptions are raised-and the court only considers public interests in disclo-
186 See supra Part I.JiB.
17 See Henry H. Perritt, Sources of Rights to Access Public Information, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J.
179, 196 (1995) ("Unlike FOIA, these common law doctrines balance the interest of the requester in ob-
taining access against the interest of the public entity in denying access.").
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sure rather than the requester's individual needs or interests in seeking the
information.
Some cases and commentators indicate that courts may be more comfort-
able with upholding agency refusals where certain exemptions are raised, or
biased in favor of government agencies as a whole. While President
Obama's administration may help curb the anti-disclosure mentality from
the agency-side, it is unclear how agencies approach disclosure. Also, some
cases indicate that requests for personal purposes, rather than government-
monitoring, are disfavored under FOIAs. 188 For agencies applying a "deny
first" approach to document requests because of these substantive safe-
guards in favor of the government, FOIA may create costs and hurdles by
dissuading individuals from combating the agency machine. The common
law, on the other hand, allows individuals to go to court and receive an or-
der compelling disclosure.
In terms of state FOIAs, it is difficult to generalize about differences and
similarities. Some state FOIAs have mechanisms that call for balancing
similar to the common law right. Other state FOIAs have only created nar-
row tools for specific situations with the legislature being explicit in their
intent to only supplement the broader common law right.189
IV. DISPLACEMENT OF THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Before considering whether the common law right has any practical use
for public access today, the threshold question must be answered: can liti-
gants even use the common law right when, arguably, statutory codifica-
tions of the right exist? In terms of whether the common law right survives,
federal and state FOIAs must be dealt with separately. This is because fed-
eral common law rights are construed more narrowly than state common
law rights. 910 In fact, as shown below, in some states an attempt to abrogate
a common law right is downright difficult-but federal common law rights
are frequently abrogated.
188 See Neal, supra note 62, at 354 (discussing disfavored purposes under the common law right).
189 As discussed in Part I.B., some state legislatures have enacted statutes that explicitly maintain the
common law right's operation. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 19.35 (2012). In these states, the state FOIA stat-
utes appear to merely be a supplement- telling courts that in some situations, records must be disclosed
or withheld, but that otherwise the court maintains its discretionary powers.
19U See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755, 769 (2013), NAT'L ASS'N OF ATT'Ys GEN. & U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, ENV'T & NATURAL RES. Div., GUIDELINES FOR JOINT STATE/FEDERAL CIVIL
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT LITIGATION 20 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/enrd/ENRD Assets/Gu
idelines-for-joint-state-federal-civil-environmental-enforcement-litigation.pdf.
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There are three primary ways that legislation can destroy common law
rights: express preemption, displacement, and conflict preemption.19 1 As a
preliminary note, the Federal FOIA is unlikely to affect state common law
rights to information. These doctrines require that a legislature expressly or
impliedly intend to abrogate a law (or making complying with both impos-
sible). 19 2 There is little overlap between the Federal FOIA and state common
law rights, because each addresses different sets of agencies-namely state
and federal. 93 Moreover, there is generally a presumption against preemp-
tion.19 4 As Congress has not indicated any intent to preempt, it does not ap-
pear that the state common law right has been entirely preempted. 95
But the Federal FOIA's displacement of the federal common law right-
and state FOLAs' displacement of state common law rights-is more plau-
sible. Both state and federal legislatures have the power to abrogate judi-
cially-created legal doctrines by replacing-or displacing-the common
law right.19 6 For displacement to occur courts must determine that the state
or federal law regulates the same subject matter that the common law right
regulates to such an extent that the statute evinces the legislatures' intent to
displace the former. 19 7 The difficulty is in determining when a legislature
has regulated a specific doctrine to the extent that the common law right is
displaced.
'.' See Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
192 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-204
(1983) ("It is well established that within constitutional limits Congress may pre-empt state authority by
so stating in express terms... [or] Congress' intent to supersede state law altogether may be found from
a 'scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it."') (quoting Fid. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982)).
"' There are instances where states have enacted privacy laws which could raise issues about federal
FOIA preemption, but such issues are outside of the scope of this article which deals with the operation
of the doctrines generally. See, e.g., Animal Welfare Soc. v. Univ. of Wash., 884 P.2d 592, 604-605
(1994) (discussing the conflict between Washington State's Public Records Act and the federal Freedom
of Information Act).
'"4 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 906 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Under 'or-
dinary... principles of conflict pre-emption,' therefore, the presumption against pre-emption should
control.") (internal citation omitted).
195 See infra Part IV.B.
196 See Angel Gomiez, 111, Preemption and Preclusion of Employee Common Law Rights by Federal and
State Statutes, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 45, 47 n.8 (1989).
19 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). As explained below, there is no indi-
cation that Congress specifically stated it preempted any other laws. Thus, only general field displace-
ment is possible.
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A. Federal FOIA's Displacement of Federal Common Law
Generally, legislatures must overtly express their intention to abrogate
common law rights-otherwise the common law rights survive.198 Moreo-
ver, canons of construction require that statutes be interpreted to avoid ab-
rogating common law rights where possible.199
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins complicated this rule by severely limiting federal common law. 20 0 In
short, this case stands for the principle that federal courts should apply state
common law as a general matter, and that federal common law has a very
limited place in the federal legal system. 20 1 Some of this rationale is based
on federalism concerns and superiority of state common law rights. The
United States Supreme Court has stated that "if state law can be applied,
there is no need for federal common law; if federal common law exists, it is
because state law cannot be used. '" 20 2
However, in the case of the common law right to information, this con-
cept is less relevant. State common law rights generally cannot be used to
compel federal agencies so federal common law is the only option 3. 20 Still,
modern jurisprudence on federal common law rights emphasizes that situa-
tions where federal common law rights exist are "few and restricted. '" 20 4
They essentially fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of
decision is "necessary to protect uniquely federal interests," and "those in
which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive
law." 205 As discussed infra20 6, one of the policies behind the common law
right is monitoring the government, thus the federal common law right to
information may be necessary to protect the "uniquely federal interest" of
monitoring federal agencies. The latter category is not applicable because
Congress has not specifically given the courts the task of maintaining a
' See Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 87 P.3d 831, 835 (Ariz. 2004); Ly v. Nystrom, 615
N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000) ("[I]f a statute abrogates the common law, the abrogation must be by
express wording or necessary implication.").
... NBZ, Inc. v. Pilarski, 520 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) ("The canons of construction provide
that a statute does not abrogate any rule of common law unless the abrogation is so clearly expressed as
to leave no doubt of the legislature's intent.").
200 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
201 Id. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law").
202 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981).
203 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496, 500 (1996).
201 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 304.
205 Nat'l Audubon Soc. v. Dep't of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Texas Industries,
Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
206 See infra p. 48.
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common law right to information. In contrast, some statutes such as the fair
use provision of the Copyright Act specifically grant the courts common
law discretionary power.20 7
Even if the federal common law right to information is not automatically
destroyed under Erie, the doctrine may still be displaced by the Federal
FOIA scheme. The Supreme Court has explained how to determine whether
a federal common law right exists in the context of federal interstate nui-
sance claims. In Milwaukee, the Court held that if an act by Congress had
displaced the federal common law by creating a comprehensive act in a
field, the common law remedy is displaced and no longer available. 208 How-
ever, the Court's reasoning relied on an inference that Congress intended
legislation to address the specific question raised by the litigants in the
case. 20 9 In other words, the Court did not merely ask whether Congress leg-
islated in an area as a general matter, but whether Congress meant to regu-
late the specific claim brought by litigants. 210 If so, the common law right no
longer exists because "[w]hen Congress addresses a question previously
governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an
unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal court disappears." 211
The Supreme Court does not hesitate to find that federal common law
rights are no longer available where Congress has addressed the right in
question. Federal common law is easily displaced by Congressional action
even arguably aimed at the subject of a common law right. For example, in
Milwaukee, the Supreme Court found that the Clean Water Act displaced
the claim at issue because Congress had already provided a remedy for sim-
ilar types of claims. 212
The most obvious argument in support of displacement of the common
law right to information is that Congress has created a carefully-tailored
legislative scheme in the Federal FOIA that addresses the same claims
brought under the common law right. Congress created specific exemptions
and a specific right to certain types of information. If this leaves some indi-
207 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
208 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 313-15.
2 0 91 d. at 319-20.
210 Id. at 315, 317.
211 Id. at 314. More recently, the Court in Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut explained the displace-
ment test as "simply whether the statute 'speaks directly to [the] question' at issue." 131 S. Ct. 2527,
2537 (2011) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,625 (1978)).
212 Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316. Similarly, in Am. Elec. Power Co., the Court noted that "[l]egislative
displacement of federal common law does not require the 'same sort of evidence of a clear and manifest
[congressional] purpose' demanded for preemption of state law." 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (quoting Milwau-
kee, 451 U.S. at 317).
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viduals without a tool to access certain information-it may be that Con-
gress decided the information should not be disclosed.
Of the few federal courts that have considered whether the common law
right to information is displaced, most have found that it has.213 The ra-
tionale is that Congress has crafted a careful balancing of public and gov-
ernment interests in the Federal FOIA and that allowing federal common
law claims would undermine this scheme. These courts have created a blan-
ket approach that emphasizes the sole manner of compelling document re-
quests-absent discovery in litigation-is the Federal FOIA. 214 The DC Cir-
cuit explained this rationale at length:
FOIA provides an extensive statutory regime for plaintiffs to request the infor-
mation they seek. Not only is it uncontested that the requested information
meets the general category of information for which FOIA mandates disclosure
• . . we have concluded that it falls within an express statutory exemption as
well. It would make no sense for Congress to have enacted the balanced
scheme of disclosure and exemption, and for the court to carefully apply that
statutory scheme, and then to turn and determine that the statute had no effect
on a preexisting common law right of access. Congress has provided a carefully
calibrated statutory scheme, balancing the benefits and harms of disclosure ...
we cannot craft federal common law when Congress has spoken directly to the
issue at hand.
2 15
In Warner Communications, the Supreme Court assumed that the com-
mon law right of access covered tapes sought by the media. 216 However, the
Court denied the common law claims because the Presidential Recordings
Act specifically provided a statutory scheme for seeking access to tapes of
this kind.217 Regardless of whether the statute would actually provide ac-
cess, the existence of the scheme indicated that Congress had already regu-
lated the merits of the plaintiffs claim-for better or worse.218 This "alter-
native means for public access tip[ped] the scales in favor of denying
release. '" 219 In U.S. v. El-Sayegh, the D.C. Circuit directly applied the rea-
soning from Warner Communications, holding that a statutory FOIA dis-
closure scheme displaced the common law right. 220 The Court broadly stated
213 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't. of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
214 See Ctr. for Nat'l. Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 936. In fact, the Supreme Court in Warner Communica-
tions found the common law right to information displaced by a record disclosure statute. See Nixon v.
Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 589 (1978).
215 Ctr. for Nat. Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 936-37.
216 435 U.S. at 599.
2 17 Id. at 603-606.
218 Id. at 604-605.
219 Id. at 606.
220 United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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that the "appropriate device [for access to executive records] is a Freedom
of Information Act request addressed to the relevant agency." 221
After El-Sayegh, the D.C. Circuit applied the common law right in Cen-
terfor National Security Studies v. US. Dep 't of Justice and also found the
federal common law inapplicable. 222 But the Court appeared to narrow its
holding to the factual circumstances, noting that the parties did not dispute
that the Federal FOIA was directly applicable and that an exemption was
squarely triggered. 223 Where an exemption was clearly present, the court
reasoned that "it would make no sense for Congress to have enacted the
balanced scheme of disclosure and exemption, and for the court to carefully
apply that statutory scheme, and then to turn and determine that the statute
had no effect on a preexisting common law right of access." 224
The language in these cases does not necessarily reach every common
law right to information case that could be brought. Rather, these courts
found the common law displaced only because Congress had addressed the
specific claims brought by the specific parties where an exemption was
triggered. No court appears to have held that every type of common law
right to information claim is completely displaced at the federal level.
In fact, the common law right still exists in terms of judicial and legisla-
tive branch claims. The Federal FOIA does not apply to those branches,
thus it may be difficult to argue that Congress has already addressed com-
mon law right to information requests served on either one. 225 Also, assum-
ing that a court agrees that the federal common law right protects a uniquely
federal interest by providing for needed citizen oversight so that the Erie
holding is not an issue-there are no federal statutes addressing these types
of claims.
It remains an open question whether there may still be common law right
to information claims concerning federal executive agencies that are un-
addressed by the Federal FOIA (and potentially still in reach of the com-
mon law right). Potentially, plaintiffs expressing a compelling need for in-
formation could argue that the Federal FOIA was not specifically designed
for their situation. The Federal FOIA was designed to provide full access to
221 Id.
222 Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
221 Id. at 937.
224 Id.
225 See generally John B. Shumadine, Striking a Balance: Statutory Displacement of Established Federal
Common Law and the D'oench Doctrine in Murphy v. F.D.I.C. and Motorcity of Jacksonville Ltd. v.
Southeast Bank, 51 ME. L. REV. 129, 136 (1999) (discussing congressional intent).
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any individual seeking a record regardless of their need.226 Thus, a requestor
could argue that Congress has not addressed claims where individuals have
a special, proprietary need for the information-because the Federal FOIA
treats all requestors the same, and has no avenue for those with a special
need.
Ultimately, federal courts are unlikely to allow claimants to bring com-
mon law right to information claims where the records appear to fit square-
ly within categories regulated by the Federal FOIA's scheme. Courts are
likely to find that the Federal FOIA directly addresses a requestor's claim
and that Congress has thus displaced the common law right. That said, dis-
placement is not an exact science, and requestors still have arguments for
non-displacement in the federal context, albeit a slim chance of success.
B. Displacement of the State Common Law Right to Information
The doctrines concerning displacement of state common law are distinct
from the doctrine of federal common law displacement. Courts have long
held that "where there [is] an established common law rule of decision,
[there can be no] statutory displacement absent an explicit indication of
such a congressional intention. '" 227 Courts appear generally unwilling to find
displacement absent such express statements. The Indiana Supreme Court
stated that other than field preemption "[a]n abrogation of the common law
will be implied [only] where the two laws are so repugnant that both in rea-
son may not stand."228 The Connecticut Supreme Court stated that common
law remedies are only inappropriate "where their application would evis-
cerate the force of the provisions of a statute.."229
While the general presumption against abrogation of state common law
is well-settled, it is not without limitation. Displacement may happen even
where the legislature is not explicit but has sufficiently addressed a specific
situation via statute. Specifically, a legislature's complete regulation of a
subject matter through statute allows courts to infer an intent to abrogate al-
ternative common law remedies.2
0
226 See supra Part H.A.
227 Shumadine, supra note 226, at 138.
221 Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC v. Kephart, 934 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. 2010).
229 Location Realty, Inc. v. Colaccino, 949 A.2d 1189, 1201 (Conn. 2008).
230 See, e.g., Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 9 (111. 2009); Caesars, 934 N.E.2d at 1123-24; Cavadi v.
DeYeso, 941 N.E.2d 23, 35 (Mass. 2011); Genies v. State, 10 A.3d 854, 863, 866-67 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2010), aff'd, 43 A.3d 1107 (Md. 2012); Briefing.com v. Jones, 126 P.3d 928,936 (Wyo. 2006).
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However, the presumption against the abrogation of common law cannot
be overstated. State law generally presumes that common law is not abro-
gated or displaced.23 1 Some state courts have required express legislative
language before setting aside common law principles. 23 2 A review of vari-
ous state cases reveals that most courts have required either: 1) a direct con-
flict between the common law and a statute, or 2) express legislative lan-
guage to displace or abrogate. 233
A small number of courts have already considered whether state FOIAs
have displaced common law rights to information. There is no clear consen-
sus in these decisions. A recent Michigan case that published shortly before
this article went to publication resoundingly held that Michigan's FOLA
displaced any state common law right.234 First, the court noted that as a gen-
eral rule the "common law remains in force until it is affirmatively modi-
fied.."235 The court also pointed to the lack of "published case law in this
state directly on point."23 6 The court then held, in part analogizing to the
federal cases in this area, that no common law right exists in Michigan fol-
lowing enactment of the state's FOIA:
Michigan's FOIA provides a comprehensive statutory scheme that governs re-
quests for public records held by public bodies. FOIA provides a detailed
course of conduct for individuals to pursue in order to obtain public records.
Included within the scheme are statutory exemptions for certain types of infor-
mation. As we have explained above, MCCA's records fall within one of those
exemptions. The Legislature has determined that those records are not subject
to disclosure. It would be illogical to conclude that this comprehensive legisla-
tion has no effect on plaintiffs' pre-existing common law right to access
MCCA's records.
237
Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey has held that in enacting a
statute relating to examination of workmen's compensation records, the
231 See, e.g., HOK Sport, Inc. v. FC Des Moines, L.C., 495 F.3d 927, 936-37 (8th Cir. 2007).
232 See, e.g., Lee v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 775 N.W.2d 326, 335-36 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
233 Id.; Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 2009) ("In order to abrogate a common-law principle,
the statute must 'speak directly' to the question addressed by the common law") (quoting United States
v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)); HOK Sport, Inc., 495 F.3d at 936-37; Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d
380, 383-84 (Ariz. 2011); People v. Ceja, 229 P.3d 995, 1001 (Cal. 2010); Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d
384, 387, 390 (Colo. 2005); Clancy Sys. Int'l v. Salazar, 177 P.3d 1235, 1237 (Colo. 2008); A.W. Fin.
Servs., S.A. v. Empire Res., Inc., 981 A.2d 1114, 1122 (Del. 2009); Cecere v. Loon Mountain Recrea-
tion Corp., 923 A.2d 198, 202 (N.H. 2007); Williams v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d
410, 416 (Ohio 2009); Rogers v. Meiser, 68 P.3d 967, 973 (Okla. 2003); Sorensen v. State Farm Auto.
Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 1233, 1239 (Wyo. 2010).
234 Coal. Protecting Auto No-Fault v. Mich. Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 916
(May 20, 2014).
235 Id. at *24.
236 Id.
237 Id. *27.
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state legislature had determined that disclosing certain documents "is ad-
verse to the public interest. '" 238 Once the legislature had made such a deci-
sion, the common law right is not applicable any time these public interests
are implicated.
However, New Jersey courts have found that the common law right of
the public to inspect records coexists with state FOIA rights. 239 Courts in
New York, 240 Washington2 1 West Virginia, 42 and Wisconsin243 have all
held that the common law right to information is not abrogated by enact-
ment of state FOIAs. One New Jersey court has noted the important place
the common law right still serves, in light of some legislatures' narrowing
of the definition of public records or those entitled to use the statute: "[t]he
range of public records available under the Right to Know Law is narrower
than under the common law ... the common-law and statutory rights are
not mutually exclusive. The two complement each other, together embody-
ing the State's strong commitment to access to public records." 244 Other
courts have avoided the issue by interpreting the statutory scheme as simply
codifying the common law right without engaging the displacement ques-
tion.245 Still other courts have assumed the common law right still exists,
without engaging the question deeply. 46 Notably, two legislatures went so
far as to specifically provide that the common law right to information is
not abolished by a state's freedom of information statute. 247 One of them has
been specifically interpreted to be much narrower than the common law
right. 248
238 Accident Index Bureau, Inc. v. Male, 229 A.2d 812, 816 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967).
239 S. Jersey Publ'g Co., Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 1991); Irval Realty, Inc.
v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 294 A.2d 425, 428 (N.J. 1972); Beck v. Bluestein, 476 A.2d 842, 848
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
24 Delaney v. Del Bello, 405 N.Y.S.2d 276, 280 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
241 Nast v. Michels, 730 P.2d 54, 58 (Wash. 1986).
242 Daily Gazette Co. v. Withrow, 350 S.E.2d 738, 746 n.9 (W.Va. 1986).
243 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35 (West 2010).
244 S. Jersey Publ g Co. Inc., 591 A.2d at 927; see also Irval Realty, 294 A.2d at 429 (stating that Right
to Know Law "clearly was not intended to diminish or in any way curtail the common law right of ex-
aminationt").
245 See, e.g., Breighner v. Mich. High SclR Athletic Ass'n, 683 N.W.2d 639, 649 (Mich. 2004) ("The
FOIA was enacted to continue the common-law right Michigan citizens have traditionally possessed to
access government documents."); Evening News Ass'nv. Troy, 339 N.W.2d 421, 427-28 (Mich. 1983).
241 See Walen. v. Dep't of Corr., 505 N.W.2d 519, 528 n.19 (Mich. 1993) (Riley, J. dissenting) ("More-
over, even if the FOIA did not permit general access to public records, our common law would almost
certainly permit such access.").
247 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47.1A-1 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 19.35.
248 See McCalin v. College Hosp., 492 A.2d 991, 995 (N.J. 1985).
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Although concrete answers do not emerge out of the displacement analy-
sis, key guiding principles do exist. First, federal courts are likely to find
the common law right displaced any time a plaintiff s claim to federal agen-
cy records appears to fit within FOIA's exemptions. In these cases, the fed-
eral common law's limited nature, coupled with congressional intent to ad-
dress the plaintiffs claim make it very likely that courts will find
displacement.
However, at the federal level, it remains an open question whether there
are situations in which a plaintiff might bring a claim that Congress has not
addressed with the Federal FOIA. It is clear that not all federal common law
rights to information are displaced. For example, access to judicial and leg-
islative records is not generally addressed by FOIAs-thus it would be dif-
ficult to credibly argue that the legislature has displaced any common law
rights in these areas. But beyond these areas, the scope remains unclear.
Second, at the state level, the common law rights are more likely to re-
main, although this is far from certain. Courts could, and some have 249 ,
found that a state legislature has addressed a specific claim by choosing to
create a relevant exemption to a FOIA statute. Then again, it may simply
make little difference in some situations. In balancing the government's in-
terests under a common law right claim, the court would likely consider the
legislature's intent to protect certain documents. Furthermore, some state
FOIAs specifically provide for a balancing test to be used, making their op-
eration almost identical to the common law operation. If a court were to al-
low a common law claim in parallel to a state FOIA litigants will likely
have to weigh which of these two available tools-which overlap signifi-
cantly-best fit with their needs.
V. THE COMMON LAW RIGHT TO INFORMATION'S PLACE IN THE CURRENT
PUBLIC ACCESS FRAMEWORK
As explained above, the common law right at both the federal and state
level does not appear to be wholly and irrefutably displaced. In situations
where the state or Federal FOIA does not appear to address the plaintiffs
claim to information, the common law is potentially available in theory.
The question then becomes, assuming that a court does not find displace-
ment of every permutation of the common law right to information, what
purpose might the common law rights serve now that we have comprehen-
sive state and Federal FOIA statutes?
249 See cases cited, supra note 231.
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As a preliminary note, most litigants may not want to use the common
law right to access information because of its inherent limitations. In other
words, the problems inherent in the common law doctrine that spurred the
creation of FOIAs in the first place will make FOIA the better option in
many situations. 2 0 For any public document reached by FOIA, unless an
exemption is raised, a litigant need show no special interest and enjoys a
powerful presumption of access. The burden is on the government to pro-
vide a legal argument that the requested documents trigger an exemption;
otherwise, the individual has an uncontestable right. Further, the requester
can go straight to the agency, avoiding costly litigation.
Litigants are likely to utilize the common law right only when: 1) a liti-
gant wants to avoid FOIA backlogs or the procedural hurdles of FOIA re-
quests, 2) a document arguably falls within a FOIA exemption, and the liti-
gant wants to avoid the potentially government-favored exemptions, 25 1 or 3)
state or Federal FOIAs simply do not address the record in question-such
as where a state FOIA does not extend to a nonresident requester.
In terms of state FOIA statutes, many states have crafted statutes with
notable restrictions or limited rights. This creates a narrow, but important,
class of cases where the common law right remains essential. For example,
states like Alabama and Arkansas only allow certain individuals to use the
FOIA 2 2, or have artificially narrowed the types of documents that can be
sought. 25 3 Virginia's restriction of its FOIA statute to its own residents was
recently upheld and will potentially spur additional restrictions in similar
veins. 25 4
In these cases, a persuasive argument can be made that the legislature has
not addressed these claims and that the common law right still exists given
that the legislature has only regulated a specific group of individuals or
claims. Some may argue that these legislatures meant to foreclose access
altogether in any situation not reached by a FOIA statute. However, this is
unlikely in light of the profound public access principles commonly es-
poused by courts and legislatures. 255 More likely, these legislatures only
meant for the default presumption for access to be afforded to the litigants
and the types of documents described in the FOIA statutes and that other
250 See infra Part V.
251 See Nowadzky, supra note 162, at 70.
252 See Nowadzky, supra note 162, at 76-77.
253 See Nowadzky, supra note 162, at 80, 86-91.
254 See McBurney v. Young, 133 S.Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013).
255 See infra Part II.B.
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cases should proceed according to the more factually-intense common law
right analysis.
This view is bolstered by the many cases and legislative declarations
stating that the common law and state FOIA statutes were meant to work in
tandem. 25 6 As explained above, courts may be comfortable with coexistence,
giving litigants the option of what tool to use depending on the situation.
Where a litigant would prefer FOIA's default presumption of disclosure and
clear exemption, she can file a FOIA request; where a litigant requires a
careful balancing of interests-her own and the government's-the com-
mon law right is available.
To the extent that states indeed see the value of a common law right to
information playing a gap-filler role; it would behoove state legislatures to
enact safe-harbor language as some legislatures have already done.25 7 The
displacement doctrine is a judicially created doctrine which presumes con-
gressional intent from a legislature's statutes. A court would have trouble
finding displacement where a legislature has specifically announced its in-
tent to preserve the common law right.
Litigants in state courts are likely to resort to their state FOIA. State
FOIAs are set up to be user-friendly, give requesters powerful default pre-
sumptions of access, and the process is streamlined with less court in-
volvement and discretion to get mired in during litigation. However, for sit-
uations where exemptions are likely to be triggered, the litigant may be able
to ask the court for a factual balancing of interests, rather than resorting to
the minimal-government-interest standard most state FOIAs employ-
although courts may end up finding the common law displaced in these sit-
uations. It remains unclear.
The Federal FOIA is a different matter. Many courts have already found
the federal common law right to be foreclosed. As discussed in Section
IV.A, the federal common law is narrowly construed, and where Congress
regulates in the vicinity of a common law doctrine, courts err on the side of
displacement. However, these courts have also been ruling on specific fac-
tual scenarios where an exemption was clearly triggered and thus it was
clear the legislature was regulating in the area. It may be that individuals
would be capable of using the common law right to compel disclosure
where an exemption is not triggered-for example, to avoid FOIA's proce-
dural hurdles and backlogs. Courts could find that the mechanisms for dis-
closure created by the Federal FOIA displace as easily as the exemptions,
256 See S. Jersey Publ'g Co. Inc. v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 1991).
257 See statutes cited supra note 248.
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but courts have not been faced with this scenario, so it remains unclear. Al-
so worth noting, requesters may have better luck arguing against displace-
ment where a requester seeks documents from the legislative branch which
is not addressed by the Federal FOIA.
Litigants could make the same arguments against displacement in the
federal context as the state context, but displacement is more likely at the
federal level and thus the risk of losing is severe. A litigant could argue that
Congress has not regulated special need cases in passing the Federal FOIA.
The Federal FOIA operates like an on-off switch as to specific documents,
either every member of the public gets access, or every member is fore-
closed. 258 For a special situation where someone shows a powerful need for
information, courts may be persuaded that the legislature has not yet ad-
dressed the issue. Courts could issue protection orders or utilize other
mechanisms to ensure that, for example, confidential information was not
publically released-but still compel disclosure because of a special need
for access to the information. Importantly, the common law right considers
the individual interests in question. This makes it more likely that FOIA-
which concerns public interests-is distinct from an individual's right to
public documents flowing, at least in part, from a proprietary interest in the
information. 259
VI. CONCLUSION
Under federal law, where a FOIA exemption is likely to be triggered, the
common law right to information may not provide assistance to those seek-
ing access to information. The limited nature of federal common law cou-
pled with the direct congressional regulation of the specific claims at issue
make displacement almost certain.
Courts have not been faced with a situation where an exemption was not
triggered and a requester attempted to use the Federal FOIA to avoid proce-
dural backlog or other hurdles. A court may have a harder time finding dis-
placement where an exemption is not at play, and thus Congress arguably
did not intend to regulate the area. But it may be that this is a meritless op-
tion, even if it were allowed by a court. Requesters can seek documents un-
der the Federal FOIA without even filing a lawsuit, they can seek statutory
251 See supra Part II.A; Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 172 (2004) ("Fur-
thermore, as we have noted, the disclosure does not depend on the identity of the requester. As a general
rule, if the information is subject to disclosure, it belongs to all.").
259 It should be noted that the public interest in disclosure and open government is clearly still an im-
portant element of common law right jurisprudence.
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attorney's fees which make paying for information easier, and when no ex-
emption is triggered there is a strong presumption favoring requestors with
a heavy burden on the government to defeat the request. Moreover, where
individuals need information from the legislative or judicial branch the
common law right remains a robust option.
Under state law, a common law right claim is more widely available.
Some courts may find displacement, but many courts are likely to allow a
common law right claim to go forward by recognizing that the FOIAs and
the common law right are coextensive and alternative tools for seeking in-
formation access. The difference may be irrelevant in many states, because
courts either consider the legislature's statutory intent in the common law
weighing, or because the state FOIAs already envision a balancing process
that weighs individual party interests. However, where a requester has a
special need for information which is not considered under a state's FOIA,
the common law right-and the accompanying interest balancing test-may
be a requester's only chance of access.
